Morse v. Frederick, 551 US 393 (2007), is the case of the United States Supreme Court where the Court held, 5-4, that the First Amendment did not prevent educators from pressing, on or across the street from a supervised event schools, student speeches that deserve to be seen as promoting illegal drug use.
In 2002, the Junior High School principal of Juneau-Douglas, Deborah Morse, suspended Joseph Frederick after she displayed a banner reading "BONG HiTS [4] JESUS" across the street from school during the torch of the 2002 Winter Olympics torch Frederick sued, claiming his constitutional right to free speech was violated. His coat was dismissed by a federal district court, but on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Frederick's right to speak was violated.
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, concluded that school officials did not violate the First Amendment. To do so, he makes three legal decisions: first, that the doctrine of "school teaching" should prevail because Frederick's speech occurs "at a school event"; second, that the speech was "deemed worthy of promoting illegal drug use"; and thirdly, that the principal can legally restrict the speech - based on the three existing First Amendment School speech precedents, other school-related jurisprudence, and "vital interest, indeed, may attract" the school in blocking drug use by students.
One scholar noted that "in plain language, holding Morse is narrow because it expressly applies only to student speeches that promote illegal drug use." He added, however, that the court could still apply it to other students' speeches that, like speeches encouraging illegal drug use, were as much as damaging the mission of school education or threatening the safety of students. "Furthermore, Morse arguably permits the point of view of discrimination from pure political speeches every time the speech mentions illegal drugs - a result that seems to contradict the First Amendment."
Video Morse v. Frederick
Background and procedural history ​​â € <â € <
On January 24, 2002, students and staff at the Juneau-Douglas High School in Alaska were allowed to leave the classroom to watch the Olympic Torch pass. Joseph Frederick, who was late for school that day, joined some friends on the sidewalk across from high school, outside of school. Frederick and his friends wait for a television camera so they can unfurl banners reading "BONG HITS 4 JESUS". Frederick was quoted as saying he first saw the phrase on the snowboarder sticker. As they put up banners, Deborah Morse's headmistress ran across the street and grabbed him.
Morse initially suspended Frederick for five days for violating the school district anti-drug policy, but raised the suspension to ten days after Frederick quoted Thomas Jefferson. Frederick administratively appealed his suspension to the supervisor, who rejected the appeal, but limited the time already spent by Frederick before the appeals school to the inspector (eight days). Frederick later appealed to the Juneau School Board, which upheld the suspension on March 19, 2002.
District court
On April 25, 2002, Frederick filed a civil rights suit (under 42 US, 1983) against Morse and the school board, claiming that they violated the federal and state constitutional rights for free speech. He seeks the help of the declaration (for a declarative verdict that his First Amendment right has been infringed), indemnification (for orders to remove references to the ten-day suspension of his school records), and monetary awards (damages, damages, and attorneys' fees).
The US District Court for Alaska District dismissed Frederick's case based on a summary verdict. The district court reasoned that Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser , compared to Tinker v. Des Moines, District of Independent Community Schools, arranged Frederick's school speech. Under this premise, the Court ruled that, given the established facts, Morse and the school board did not infringe on Frederick's First Amendment rights, since Morse had reasonably interpreted the banner as contrary to the school's policy on the prevention of drug abuse. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit reverses the decision of the District Court. The panel's decision was written by Judge Andrew Kleinfeld.
First, the Court ruled that the incident should be interpreted in school-teaching doctrines, even though Frederick stood across the street, and not at school.
Thus, for Judge Kleinfeld, "the question is whether a school can, in the absence of concerns about impaired educational activities, punish and censor non-disrupt, off-campus speech by students during official school-activity because speeches promote social messages as opposed to which is liked by the school. The answer under the supervision, the old precedent is clearly 'No'. "To achieve this determination, the Court asked whether Frederick's constitutional rights were violated. The Court, in holding (counter District Court) that Tinker v. Des Moines School Independent Community School provides a control analysis, differentiated Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood District School v. Kuhlmeier . The court explained:
Fraser argues that the right of high school students to freedom of speech in schools is not coexistent with adult rights, and the "very offensive..." for adults may be characterized as unauthorized adultery in the school context. 12 Fraser focuses on the sexual nature of cruelty in punitive school speeches, in contrast to the "political outlook" of the Tinker-protected speech. 13 Our case differs from Fraser in Frederick's non-sexual speech (sexual greeting can be expected to stimulate interference between new hormones and adulthood), and does not interfere with school assemblies. Also, it is not so easy to distinguish speeches about marijuana from political speeches in the context of a country where referendums on the legalization of marijuana happen repeatedly and controversial state court decisions on a topic that has recently been issued. 14 The phrase "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" may be funny, stupid, or insulting, depending on the person's point of view, but not "clearly offensive" in the way of sexual innuendo.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier can also be distinguished. At Kuhlmeier , the Supreme Court declared that high school students do not have First Amendment rights to publish articles on pregnancy and divorce in school newspapers over principal objections, where newspapers are produced in the upper classes. journalism, edited by journalism teachers as part of classroom teaching, and paid for school fees. 16 The Court distinguishes Tinker on the grounds that "the question of whether the First Amendment requires schools to tolerate certain student speeches - the questions we ask at Tinker - is different from the question of whether the First Amendment requires schools to support their promotion of particular student speeches." 17 The student newspaper is " part of the school curriculum ". 18 Excluding any First Amendment duty to "promote" the student's point of view [** 14] means that schools need to retain authority to refuse to "sponsor" speeches like Frederick, who arguably promotes drug use. 19 Kuhlmeier does not control cases in bars, however, because Frederick's pro-drug banners are not sponsored or supported by schools, nor are they part of the curriculum, nor do they occur as part of official school activities. Kuhlmeier might apply if Frederick insists on banners "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" in his art class, but that's not what the record shows. His impressions [* 1120] took place outside the school while the students were released so they could watch Coca-Cola and the Olympic activities.
Public response
Juneau school district supervisor Peggy Cowan stated, "My concern is that [court decisions] can jeopardize our ability to send consistent messages on the use of illegal drugs."
Certiorari and oral arguments
The school board filed a petition to the Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit's decision. On December 1, 2006, the Court accepted the case.
The oral arguments were heard on the morning of March 19, 2007. Kenneth Starr first spoke on behalf of the principal who petitioned. He described the rule in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 US 503 (1969) as "that there is a right to a political speech that is subject to interference - that speech does not interfere". He defines disorders in general terms as behaviors that are contrary to the mission of school education, and in certain terms as violations of school policies that are announced to enforce and support laws relating to marijuana control (and other laws in general). Starr also cites cases of Bethel School District v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675 (1986) and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Starr notes that at Tinker there is no written policy; it is a matter of "non-standard discretion" being implemented. The case was said to be related to school disciplinary action "throwing orthodoxy to prevent discussion of ideas". Justice Souter said that 'Bong Hits 4 JESUS' "sounds like just a provocative statement of a child to me". Starr responded by saying "the key is to allow school officials to interpret the message as long as the interpretation makes sense."
Deputy Attorney General Edwin Kneedler speaks on behalf of the US government to support the applicant. He said: "The First Amendment does not require public school officials to stand aside and allow students entrusted to their supervision and care to promote or encourage illegal use of drugs." He cites cases of Education Council v. Earls and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier for him.
Douglas K. Mertz, from Juneau, Alaska, for open-ended respondents, "This is a case of freedom of speech, it's not about drugs." Chief Justice John Roberts replied: "This is a case of money.Your client wants money from the principal personally for his actions in this case." Mertz stressed that torchlight was not sponsored by schools; that he never attended school at all before stretching banners; that "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" is meant to be - and is regarded as - a really funny message; and that banner strikes do not cause any disturbance. Based on these facts, he concluded, his case "does not present the issue of school authority over student expression on campus or in school-sponsored activities".
Starr denied. He quoted the Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Education Board v. Earls as the case which shows the Court's past strong stance on matters relating to fighting the "scourge of drugs". In closing and summarizing, he said:
To promote drugs is not at all consistent with the mission of school education. Courts have spoken more broadly with regard to the need to submit to school officials in identifying educational missions. We know that there is a constitutional limit (for legitimate political expression). The boundaries were captured at Tinker . A purely passive political speech reflecting part of the school board is a standard discretionary effort to extinguish any kind of controversial discussion, which delivers an orthodoxy to the classroom: we are still far from it.
Maps Morse v. Frederick
Opinions
Court Opinion
Supreme Court Justice Roberts, writing for four Supreme Court judges, concluded that school officials did not violate the First Amendment by seizing pro-drug banners and suspending students responsible for it. Having read the background in Part I of opinion, in Part II he determined that the doctrinal "speech school" should apply because Frederick's speech occurred "at a school event"; Part III determines that the speech "is reasonably seen as promoting illegal drug use"; and Section IV, asked whether the principal legally restricted the saying, concluded that he could - under the three existing First Amendment School speech precedents, other school-related jurisprudence, and "vital interest - indeed, perhaps interesting". in blocking the use of drugs by students.
Speech is under the jurisprudence of a school speech
First, Roberts decided that the Court should analyze Frederick's speech under the comparative doctrine of the "school speech" - rejecting "at the beginning" Frederick's opinion that the case should be considered under the jurisprudence of ordinary freedom of speech. While acknowledging that past precedents reflect "some uncertainty at the outside when courts should apply school precedents," Roberts added: "but not on these facts". Roberts repeats the situation, then explains: "Under these circumstances, we agreed with the inspector that Frederick could not 'stand among his fellow students, during school hours, on activities approved by the school and claim he was not in school.' "
Speech interpreted in principle
Furthermore, Roberts decided that the principal conclusion that Frederick's banners "advocate the use of illegal drugs" makes sense. Recognizes that the banner message is "vague", but it can not be denied as a "reference to illegal drugs". In reaching this conclusion, Roberts contrasts "the lack of alternate meanings that may be held by banners" to the fact that both immediate interpretations of the words support this conclusion:
First, the phrase can be interpreted as a necessity: "[Take] bong hits..." - equivalent messages, as Morse explains in his declaration, to "smoking marijuana" or "using illegal drugs". Or, the phrase can be seen as celebrating drug use - "bong hits [is a good thing]", or "[we take] a hit bong".
And even if the second interpretation does not support the conclusion of the principle that banners advocate the use of illegal drugs,
we found no significant difference between celebrating illegal drug use among fellow students and direct advocacy or promotion. See Guiles v. Marineau , 461 F. 3d 320, 328 (CA2 2006) (discusses the case and describes the sign as a "pro-drug banner")
Enclosing this discussion, Roberts rejected two alternative accounts for Frederick's speech provided in disagreements: first, disagreements noted that Frederick "just wanted to get on television", characterized as "a credible and non-contradictory explanation for the message". Roberts joins: "But that is a picture of Frederick's motive for displaying banners, that's not an interpretation of what the banners say." Second, disagreements emphasize the importance of political speech and the need to encourage "national debate on serious issues". Roberts rejoined that "Frederick does not even think that the banner conveys any political or religious message"; "This is clearly not a case of political debate over the criminalization of drug or ownership use."
The First Amendment allows schools to limit such remarks
Finally, Roberts asks if a principal can limit such a speech. He deduces that he can.
He began by reviewing the jurisprudence of a school court speech:
- First, Roberts summarizes that student expression can be suppressed only if the school official reasonably concludes that it will "materially and substantially interfere with work and school discipline" - observes however that this doctrine originates from a case ( Tinker v. Des Moines, Independent Community School Dist.) In which students engage in "political speech" in "silent and passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disturbance or disturbance" (wearing armbands, for expressed "disapproval of Vietnam's hostility and advocacy of their ceasefire, to make their views known, and, by their example, to influence others to adopt them." Id, at 514), and where "[t] he simply draws the Court's concern underlying the school's actions is "the sole desire to avoid the discomfort and inconvenience that always accompanies an unpopular point of view," or "kei urge to avoid the controversy that might result from expression ". Roberts commented on this opinion. with a quote from Virginia v. Black - the political speech is "the essence of what the First Amendment is designed to protect". 538 AS 343, 365 (2003).
- Secondly, Roberts quoted Betel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser . The Jurisprudence of Fraser is controversial, but Roberts refuses to apply or resolve disputed detention of the case ("We do not need to resolve this debate to decide the case"); on the contrary, it explains that "[f] or the present goal, it is sufficient to filter out from Fraser two basic principles":
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- that "the constitutional rights of students in public schools do not automatically coincide with the rights of adults in other settings" ("given the specific characteristics of the school environment").
- that the analysis of the "substantial annoyances" determined by Tinker "is not absolute" (ie, flexible/optional).
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- Thirdly, Roberts cites the latest student speech case, Dist Hazelwood School. v. Kuhlmeier . In this case, the Court allowed schools to "train editorial control over the style and content of student speeches in school-sponsored expressive activities" (refusing to publish articles in school papers that "the public might reasonably feel the imprimatur of the school") "during the course of action they are quite related to legitimate pedagogical issues ". Robert found that this case, though factually different, "remains instructive because it reinforces the two principles mentioned above".
Roberts then cites the case citing Tinker in the process of interpreting the qualification status that other Constitutional rights gained at school - Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton , New Jersey v. T.Ã, L.Ã, O. , Board Ed. Independent School Dist. No. 92 from Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls . Given these points, Roberts devotes his longest analysis of the "important interests and possibly attracts" the government in preventing drug use by students. Up to this point, the opinion cited statistics illustrating the problems of drug abuse by youth. It further notes that part of the school's education mission is "to educate students about the dangers of illicit drugs and to prevent their use". The District Court also noted "peer pressure perhaps" is the most important factor that causes school children to take drugs. "" The Court's interpretation of Frederick's banners sees the banner as a kind of peer pressure. Based on these concerns, the opinion concludes that the principal's actions are motivated by the danger of "serious and verbal" drug abuse that is very different from the amorphous fear of anti-war sentiments while playing on Tinker.
In Tinker, the principal has punished students for wearing an anti-black arm tire based on "fear or anxiety of distinguishable disturbance" or "the sole desire to avoid... discomfort and discomfort". Here, however, the concern about student drug abuse "goes far beyond the abstract desire to avoid controversy". The Morse Headmaster's failure to act against the banner "will send a strong message to responsible students, including Frederick, about how seriously the school is about the dangers of illegal drug use". The First Amendment, concluding the opinion, "does not require schools to tolerate at school expression events that contribute to students' dangers".
Concurrences
Judge Clarence Thomas wrote an agreement stating that students in a public school have no right to be free to speak and that Tinker should be canceled. Thomas wrote, "In my view, the history of public education indicates that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect the students' speeches in public schools." He praised Hugo Black's different opinions about Tinker and called it "prophethood". Thomas quotes the doctrine in loco parentis, which means "to replace the parents", he says. He traces the history of public education in America back to its colonial roots. According to Thomas, since public schools were originally intended to replace private teachers, public schools could discipline students as they liked and have a much stronger hand in what happened in the classroom. "In short," he continued, "in the earliest public schools, teachers taught, and students listened in. The teachers ordered, and the students were obedient." He argues that because parents entrust their parenting to the teacher, the teacher has the right to act on the parent's premises during school hours. Therefore, teachers should be able to discipline students if necessary. Thomas railed against Tinker for "grabbing [a local school district as a" traditional authority for justice. "Thomas believes that Frederick does not speak nonsense or publicly advocates drug use, but provides constitutional protection for impermanence such as" will. should 'give control of the public school system to public school students.' "
Judge Samuel Alito, joined Justice Anthony Kennedy, wrote an agreement indicating that he agreed with the majority opinion to the extent that:
(A) it is no more than continuing that public schools can limit the speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as an advocate of illegal drug use and (b) it does not provide support for the limitation of words that can be interpreted as reasonable comments on any political issue or social, including speeches on issues such as "wisdom of war on drugs or legalizing marijuana for drug use".
Alito agrees that Morse does not violate Frederick's First Amendment rights and insists in his agreement that the holding applies only to students advocating illegal drug use. He opposes "educational missions" and in loco parentis analysis that support the "special characteristics" of the schools he identifies to ensure students' physical security. Alito concluded that an exception should be made to the guarantee of freedom of speech of the First Amendment to protect the students; Because according to Alito, advocacy of illicit drugs may lead to violence. But Alito insisted that a small reduction of what the First Amendment protected was "at the end of what allowed the First Amendment".
Concurrence in part and partial disagreement
Judge Stephen Breyer agreed in part and disagreed, arguing that the Court should not directly answer the First Amendment question in this case but decide on the basis of quality immunity. Quality immunity is an affirmative defense that requires courts to enter judgments that support government employees accused of violating individual rights unless employee behavior violates "clearly established laws or constitutional rights that a reasonable person will know". Since it is unclear whether the principal's actions in dropping banners violate the First Amendment, Breyer will only issue a narrow decision indicating that he is protected by quality immunity and does not go further.
Dissent
Judge John Paul Stevens, in disagreement agreed by Judge Souter and Judge Ginsburg, argued that "The court committed a serious violation of the First Amendment in enforcing - indeed, praising - the school's decision to punish Frederick for expressing views with which he disagrees." Stevens wrote :
... The school's interest in protecting his students from exposure to speeches 'is reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use'... can not justify disciplining Frederick for his attempt to make ambiguous statements to television viewers simply because it contains oblique references to drugs. The First Amendment demands more, indeed, much more.
Stevens criticized the decision of the majority as one of "underestimating the two main principles upon which Tinker rested," for "upholding the punishment imposed on the basis of disagreement of the hearer with his understanding (or, more likely, misunderstanding) from the point of view view of the speaker ". In addition, he noted, "Encouraging drug use may increase the likelihood that a listener will try illegal drugs, but that's hardly justifying censorship". "[C] issued a pro-drug speech for a unique rough treatment found no support in our case law and contrary to the values ​​protected by the First Amendment."
Stevens also questioned the majority interpretation of banners as a serious incitement to drug use:
Admittedly, some high school students (including those who use drugs) are stupid. Most students, however, do not shave their brains at the school gate, and most students know stupid advocates when they see it. The idea that the message on this banner will really convince the average student or even the dumbest to change his behavior is the most unreasonable.
Stevens argues that "it is very unwise to make specific rules for talking about the use of drugs and alcohol," pointing to historical examples of both opposition to the Vietnam War and the Resistance to the Prohibition in the 1920s. Pointing to the current debate about medical marijuana, Stevens concluded, "Surely our national experience with alcohol should alert us to speeches that dampen suggestions - but it is not clear - that it would be better to tax and regulate marijuana rather than survive in vain attempts to ban its use entirely. "
Academic comments
Melinda Cupps Dickler
Melinda Cupps Dickler, in his article "The Morse Quartet: First Student Speech and Amendment" in the Loyola Law Review, provides a commentary survey that followed immediately after the case: Some commentators have suggested that Morse indicates a split amongst the Judge on the right to speak students and continue the erosion of Fraser and Kuhlmeier against the rights of the First Amendment of the students. He regarded this proposal as "not surprising" given the results of decisions, colloquialism, and accusations of the Judge who disagreed that the opinion "committed serious violence against the First Amendment". He added that other commentators have asserted that while Morse does not dramatically change the law regarding student speeches, it fails to answer one of the questions left by the Tinker trilogy. He noted that these questions - what First Amendment protection owes to student speeches, and how the court should analyze its censorship - are currently important because schools are struggling with discriminatory speech or hate speech issues, and student speeches that threaten violence. Furthermore, "such questions are always important because schools are a training ground for our citizens and future leaders."
Kenneth Starr
Kenneth Starr, former Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Pepperdine, and who argued for Morse before the Supreme Court, introduced a symposium on a case that noted that Supreme Court Justice Roberts "sought to maintain a fairly narrow decision", limiting the case "to this problem. public schools' to keep the education process free of messages about illegal drugs "and drawing from the existing student speech jurisprudence" which allows wise school administrators to keep out of the antisocial message education environment celebrating drug use ".
Erwin Chemerinsky
A leading constitutional law expert, Erwin Chemerinsky, participated in the same symposium, exploring how this decision would be understood and implemented by school officials, school boards, and lower court judges. He suggested that the opinion was misdirected and - from the perspective of the First Amendment - is highly undesirable, arguing that the decision can not be justified under the existing First Amendment principle, which can be seen as granting student punishment powers for speeches deemed unpleasant or offensive, even just teenagers. However, he notes the concrete opinion of Justice Alito, which suggests that majority opinion may be very narrow and based on a very unusual factual context; Chemerinsky notes that if Judge Alito's views are seen as defining the scope of detention, then this case only establishes the power of schools to punish speeches that encourage illegal drug use rather than allowing school officials to punish student speeches. Thus, despite the fact that Morse v. Frederick is consistent with decisions of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts over the last two decades, his expectation is that the majority opinion of Supreme Court Justices will be read through the prism of Judge Alito's consultative opinion, thus having little influence on the very first Amendment rights of students.
Next legal interpretation
Melinda Cupps Dickler noted that "Some courts that have discussed Morse have disagreed about the extent of their ownership," endorsing this claim with the following quote:
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- Compare Lowery v. Euverard , 497 F.3d 584, 602 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., concurring) (noting that Morse > holding narrow), and Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. , 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596-97 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (repeats that Morse does not change the template Tinker ), with Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist. , 494 F.3d 978, 9984 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that widespread Morse holding). The Layshock Court states that Morse does not change the basic framework defined by the trilogy Tinker, which is described as a scheme where Fraser and Kuhlmeier are exceptions to Tinker general rules. Layshock , 496 F. Supp. 2d at 596. Significantly, however, the court cites both Morse and Tinker as it requires courts to submit to school officials' decisions about punishing student speeches. Id . at 597. On the other hand, the court also accepts the argument of Alito's alleged justice in Morse when it states that Morse does not allow school officials to organize student speeches only on the grounds that it is incompatible with school education mission. Id . at 599.
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- Instead, the Eleventh Circuit extends the Morse reason for illegal drugs into the context of student speeches that are "interpreted as threats of violence in schools". Boim , 494 F.3d at 984 (enforcing the suspension of a high school student for a labeled story as a "dream" in which he describes shooting his math teacher). In addition, the court concludes that Morse supports the idea that student speeches can be organized in which "[in] professional observations of school administrators... certain expressions [student speeches] have caused, and can therefore lead to an unhealthy and potentially learning environment that is not safe ". ID. in 983 (cites Scott V. Sch. Bd., 324 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir 2003)). Some commentators predict that the court will expand Morse to limit further protection for student speeches. See, for example, Hilden, supra note 12 (discusses Wisniewski v. Bd. From Educ. Weedsport Cent.Sh Dist. , 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also infra text accompanying note 17 (provides further discussion on Wisniewski , where the Second Circuit is quoted for Morse, but applied Tinker).
Groups involved
American Civil Liberties Union directly participated in this case on the side of Joseph Frederick. The Center for Individual Rights, the Anti-Censorship National Coalition, and other groups advocating the protection of the First Amendment filed the amici curiae to support Frederick. Students for Reasonable Drug Policy also noted that prohibiting drug-related speech would undermine their ability to have chapters in public schools. The American Center for Justice and Justice, and the Rutherford Institute, and several other Christian rightist groups also briefed Frederick on the grounds that if schools could prohibit "offensive" they would also be able to ban religious speeches that are not approved by administrators. At this point, Christian right groups won, because the Supreme Court explicitly refused to argue that the school board could discipline an "offensive" speech, noting that "many political and religious speeches may be considered offensive to some" and the concern is "not that Frederick's speech was offensive, but it was considered as promoting illegal drug use ".
The National School Board Association supported Morse and the Juneau school district, arguing that schools should be able to organize controversial speeches. US lawyer General Paul Clement proposed a brief amicus to support the school district's decision to ban controversial speeches.
On March 19, 2007, Students for Useful Drug Policy held a free speech meeting at the Supreme Court during the oral argument. The Drug Policy Alliance and the National Association of Youth Rights help with the rally, bringing dozens of students from across the country to court proceedings.
Aftermath
The decision of the US Supreme Court did not solve all the problems in this case. Frederick claimed his speech rights under the Alaska Constitution were violated, and the matter was disputed before the Alaska Appeals Court in September 2008. However, the school district agreed to settle out of court before the judge reached a decision. In November 2008, the district paid Frederick $ 45,000 to settle all remaining claims and agreed to hire a neutral constitutional lawyer to lead a forum on the Juneau-Douglas High School student speech at the end of the school year.
The original "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner is now hanging in the Newseum's First Amendment gallery in Washington, D.C.
See also
- Cannabis in the United States
- Marijuan legal history in the United States
- List of US Supreme Court cases, volume 551
Explanation notes
References
Further reading
- Foster, James C. (2010). BONG BLACK 4 JESUS: A perfect constitutional storm in the capital of Alaska . Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press. ISBN 978-1-60223-089-7.
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Kozlowski, Dan V.; Bullard, Melissa E.; Deets, Christian (2009). "Unconditional Rights: Student Speed ​​and Conflicting Interpretation of Morse v. Frederick ". Journalism & amp; Bulk Quarterly Communications . 86 (1): 138-156. doi: 10.1177/107769900908600109.
External links
- Text Morse v. Frederick , 551 US 393 (2007) is available from: Ã, Cornell Ã, Ã, CourtListener Justin Google Scholar Supreme Court (slip opinion)
- Bong Hits 4 Jesus Toke Two - The Washington Post Opinion, Emil Steiner
- Supreme Court Oral Transcript Note
- Demonstration demonstration video free March 19 at US Supreme Court
- Analysis of Supreme Court ruling by Andy Carvin
- Opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
- Yale Law Journal comment
- MSNBC articles about an incident
- Washington wire article
- The case summary of Law.com
- Law.com certificate. candidates
- Bong Hits 4 Jesus Toke Three - The Washington Post Opinion, Emil Steiner
- The Student Press Law Center of the Court of Appeal's decision
- San Francisco Gate on appeal
- A brief list submitted in this case, including some amicus briefs
- Semantic analysis touches 4 Jesus
- Bong Hits video 4 Jesus songs about this case
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